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1.  Introduction 
 
Recently market upheavals have led to increased scrutiny and regulation of short-selling. 
Opponents argue that market manipulation by short sellers distorts prices. Concerns about this 
possibility motivated the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to make short selling harder 
by banning certain methods of doing so for a selected list of firms.1 On the other hand, defenders 
of short selling argue that short-sellers help prevent firms from becoming highly overvalued (a 
situation which can result in market crashes).  
We test here whether short-arbitrageurs respond to firm overvaluation, and whether they 
succeed in correcting it, by measuring the effect on short selling of a proxy for market 
misvaluation, accruals. We further test whether constraints on short arbitrage exacerbate the 
accrual anomaly.  
Accounting adjustments to earnings, as reflected in a firm’s operating accruals, are strong 
and robust negative predictors of future abnormal stock returns.2 Indeed, Fama and French 
(2007) identify the accrual anomaly as among the most pervasive and robust of the well-known 
financial anomalies. Several authors suggest that the accrual anomaly derives from investor 
naiveté (e.g., Sloan 1996). Under this hypothesis, high accruals cause overvaluation, and 
subsequent low abnormal returns when this overvaluation is corrected. Indeed, market 
inefficiency is the predominant interpretation of the accrual anomaly.3 Two natural questions 
                                               
1
 These changes were motivated by recent upheavals in mortgage markets, which have led to dramatic drops in the 
stock prices of private Government Sponsored Enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ) as well as those of 
important financial firms (K. Scannell and J. Strasburg, Wall Street Journal, p. A1, July 16, 2008).  
2
 Operating accruals (Sloan 1996) are negative predictors of future returns, as are various accrual components (e.g. 
operating, investing, and financing accruals; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna 2005), and more inclusive 
variables that contain accruals (Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn 2003; Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang 2004).  
3
 The abovementioned studies document abnormal returns after controlling for standard benchmarks, which suggests 
that these effects do not derive from rational risk premia. Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2007) provide evidence that 
the accrual anomaly is not captured by a rational multifactor pricing model in which factors are built based upon the 
return-predicting characteristic (accruals). Furthermore, operating accruals are positively associated with 
overoptimism in analysts’ forecasts of future earnings (Teoh and Wong 2002), and auditors also do not make full 
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raised by this evidence are whether arbitrageurs recognize the anomaly and trade to profit from 
it; and the extent to which arbitrage activity reduces mispricing.  
 Short interest, the amount of short selling in a stock, provides a revealing window into 
the determinants of arbitrage activity and the extent to which arbitrage succeeds in eliminating 
mispricing. Since it is harder or more costly to sell a stock short than to go long, arbitrageurs can 
more easily exploit underpricing than overpricing. Thus, constraints on short arbitrage can 
explain why several stock return anomalies are stronger on the short side (predictable negative 
returns) than on the long side (predictable positive returns).4  We therefore argue that asymmetry 
in return predictability (defined as a difference in the absolute values of top decile and bottom 
decile returns) is an indicator of the relative effectiveness of short versus long arbitrage. 
 Thus, this paper has two main goals: to test whether investors engage in short arbitrage of 
the accrual anomaly, and to use asymmetry in return predictability to test whether short arbitrage 
activity succeeds in constraining mispricing. In addition, we test reasonable predictions about the 
comparative statics of short arbitrage: whether firm and market characteristics that proxy for 
mispricing pressure and costs of or barriers to short selling affect the extent of short arbitrage and 
the degree of return asymmetry in the predicted fashion.  
 If sophisticated investors engage in short arbitrage of overpriced stocks, then their trades 
should increase short interest when forecasting variables such as accruals predict lower returns, 
i.e., when accruals are high. Furthermore, if short arbitrage operates effectively, we expect to see 
                                                                                                                                                       
use of information contained in accruals (Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 2001). Polk and Sapienza (2009) use an 
accruals-based variable as a proxy for mispricing to test its effects on corporate investment. 
4
 Examples include post-earnings announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas 1989), momentum (Hong, Lim, and 
Stein 2000), and the sustainability or Net Operating Assets effect (Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh and Zhang 2004). Ali and 
Trombley (2006) examine the effect of short sale constraints on asymmetry in the momentum anomaly. Using 
several kinds of tests, Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) find that downward price discovery is inhibited in countries 
where short sales are not allowed or not practiced, and that prices incorporated negative information faster in five 
countries after they removed short sale restrictions. Greenwood (2009) finds that special selling restrictions in Japan 
associated with stock splits lead to very high returns that reverse when the restrictions are relaxed. 
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a relatively low asymmetry in the magnitude of abnormal returns between the downside of the 
anomaly (e.g., when accruals are high) and the upside of the anomaly (when accruals are low), as 
compared to a market where short arbitrage is much more constrained than long arbitrage.  
A recent set of papers suggest a rich array of determinants of short selling, including size, 
share turnover, book-to-market, residual standard deviation, and institutional ownership 
(Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 2005, Nagel 2005, D’Avolio 2002). The motivation for these 
variables is discussed in Section 2. To provide sharper tests of the determinants and effects of 
short arbitrage, we exploit these variables either as controls or as parameters to vary for 
comparative statics tests. Ali and Trombley (2006) further verify the importance of several of 
these variables as determinants of short selling.  
Past literature has provided little evidence that investors use short sales to arbitrage the 
accrual anomaly. Short sellers do not seem to arbitrage the overvaluation of firms associated 
with high operating accruals during the 1990-98 period among U.S. (non-NASDAQ) exchange-
traded stocks (Richardson 2003). Richardson (2003) suggests that short sellers may be ignoring 
valuable information. For a sample of firms that engaged in fraudulent or erroneous reporting 
leading to restatements during the 1997-2002 period, prior short selling was related to accruals 
(Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman 2006). A sample that is post-selected based on later 
events can provide insight about whether short sellers use accrual information to predict future 
events, but does not provide a test (nor do the authors claim it tests) of whether short sellers 
arbitrage the accrual anomaly. 
 There are several other key differences between our tests and those in past research. We 
systematically examine arbitrage of the accrual anomalies in a general sample that includes both 
NASDAQ and NYSE firms and a 16-year (1988-2003) time period instead of the 6 to 9-year 
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time periods and/or post-selected samples of exceptional firms used in other recent work. It is 
useful to include smaller NASDAQ firms which are informationally more opaque, since this is 
where we expect to see more mispricing and higher costs of short arbitrage. Furthermore, we 
find that the spread in accruals between the top and bottom accrual deciles among NASDAQ 
firms is more than 110% higher than among NYSE firms. This suggests a much greater range of 
investor misperceptions on NASDAQ. It is informative to include a longer time period that 
includes not only the great bull market of the 1990’s, but the high-tech stock market crash of 
2000-2002 and the earlier (late 1980s) recession. In contrast with other recent work, we include 
an extensive set of test controls. This is crucial for testing whether there is short arbitrage of the 
accrual anomaly, as contrasted with short selling in response to other known determinants of 
short interest, or short arbitrage against some other anomaly variable such as book-to-market or 
momentum that happens to be correlated with accruals.  
Perhaps most importantly, we exploit proxies for market liquidity and the ease of 
borrowing the stock to test the comparative statics of short arbitrage. We test whether greater 
ease of short-selling encourages greater short arbitrage. We also test whether greater ease and 
lower risk of undertaking short arbitrage strategies makes it more effective, in the sense of 
reducing the asymmetry between the upside versus the downside of the accrual anomaly. 
It is important to perform comparative statics tests to verify whether the link between 
accruals and short-interest is causal, rather than a consequence of model misspecification such as 
a correlated omitted variable. Our comparative statics tests are also crucial for assessing whether 
any measured return asymmetry is caused by constraints on short arbitrage rather than other 
causes.  
In sharp contrast with previous findings, we find strong evidence of short arbitrage of the 
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accrual anomaly. In univariate tests we find that high-accrual firms have higher short interest. 
Evidence of short arbitrage activity is mainly confined to the top accruals decile. The effect is 
stronger among NASDAQ firms, for which the mean short interest in the highest accrual decile 
is over 40% higher than the mean short interest of the lowest accrual decile.  But even among 
NYSE firms (which more closely match the Richardson (2003) sample) there is some evidence 
of higher short-selling of high-accrual firms (significant at the 10% level). Furthermore, we find 
that firms that move into the top accrual decile experience increases in short interest relative to 
the preceding year.   
However, it is crucial in testing for short arbitrage of an anomaly to include controls, 
since the anomaly variable (accruals) is likely to be correlated with other predictors of abnormal 
returns (such as book-to-market, and momentum) that investors might be arbitraging, and other 
determinants of short interest such as size, share turnover, and institutional ownership. One way 
to control for firm fixed effects is to perform an analysis in changes. We find that when firms 
move into the top accrual decile from one year to the next, there is a significant increase in short 
interest relative to the preceding year (even among NYSE firms). More importantly, in 
multivariate tests that include appropriate controls, we find a significant positive relationship 
between accruals and short interest. Furthermore, we document a significant positive interaction 
effect between accruals and institutional holdings, suggesting that when shares are easier to 
borrow, there is more short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly.   
We also test the effectiveness of short arbitrage in attenuating the short side of the accrual 
anomaly. Return asymmetry in the accrual anomaly can arise from the extent of constraints on 
short-selling and with mispricing pressure. Previous literature suggests that institutions are the 
main lenders of stock for short selling, so that institutional ownership is a key measure of the 
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ease of borrowing stock. We find a significant negative relationship between abnormal return 
asymmetry and institutional ownership (a proxy for the amount of loanable shares), after 
controlling for proxies for liquidity (which affects the ease of short-selling and the risk of short 
squeezes), residual volatility (which makes short-selling riskier), and mispricing pressure (which 
can overwhelm the arbitrage capital of investors who are willing to sell short).  
The liquidity tests provide further confirmation that greater ease of short arbitrage 
reduces asymmetry. We find that liquidity as proxied by Size and Turnover is negatively related 
to return asymmetry. The standard deviation of market model residuals (STDRES), as a proxy 
for disagreement and risk, can capture the degree to which the capital of short arbitrageurs can be 
overwhelmed by mispricing pressure. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that higher 
STDRES is also associated with greater return asymmetry. 
There is also much greater hedge returns and asymmetry of returns from the accrual 
anomaly among NASDAQ than NYSE firms. The greater hedge returns on NASDAQ come 
mainly from much greater abnormal returns from shorting high-accrual NASDAQ firms (80 
basis points per month, t = 7.62) than from shorting high-accrual NYSE firms (25 basis points 
per month, t = 2.37). On NASDAQ accrual-strategy abnormal profits are highly asymmetric, 
with no significant long-side gains from holding firms in the lowest accrual decile. In contrast, 
on NYSE profits are basically symmetric between the long and short sides. These findings 
suggest that on average short arbitrage may be more costly, difficult, or risky among NASDAQ 
firms than among NYSE firms.   
 Overall, our findings on differences across exchanges suggest that limited information, 
limited liquidity, and more extreme accruals contribute to greater misvaluation among NASDAQ 
firms, that this greater misvaluation induces greater short-selling of overpriced firms, but that 
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such short arbitrage is severely constrained by risk, illiquidity, and especially the supply of 
loanable shares, so that the downside anomaly remains stronger among NASDAQ firms. 
 There has been other recent research that takes advantage of the information in short 
interest to provide insight into the arbitrage of accounting-related anomalies. There is evidence 
that short sellers take advantage of overpricing as measured by high fundamental-to-price ratios, 
such as cash-flow-to-price, earnings-to-price and book-to-market (Dechow et al., 2001). Dechow 
et al. (2001) also report that firms with large short positions tend to have high institutional 
ownership, consistent with a greater supply of loanable shares or else with institutions being 
more willing to sell short. 
 This paper differs from Dechow et al. (2001) in several ways. Our paper tests for short 
arbitrage of the accrual anomaly, which is predominantly viewed in the literature as a market 
inefficiency. In contrast, there is a great deal of controversy over whether the value effect (e.g., 
the book-to-market anomaly) reflects mispricing or rational risk premia.5 So in our paper it is 
relatively clear-cut that the short interest tests are actually about the arbitrage of mispricing. Our 
paper includes a rich set of further control variables (including book-to-market) suggested by 
recent literature on short interest and on the predictability of returns, which helps ensure that the 
short-selling patterns we identify relationship are coming from short arbitrage of the accrual 
anomaly rather than an accidental correlation. We go further to identify whether the correlation 
between the anomaly variable (accruals in our case) with short interest come from a causal 
relationship, by testing whether the relation is stronger in firms for which it is easier to borrow 
stock (as proxied by institutional holdings). Finally, we test the effectiveness of short arbitrage 
                                               
5
 As documented by Fama and French (1993), there is comovement associated with portfolios formed based upon 
book-to-market. The 3-factor model explains much of the ability of book-to-market to predict the cross-section of 
returns. This is consistent with a rational factor pricing model, although there has been further debate associated 
with more stringent tests (Daniel and Titman 1996) and with  the attempt to link the book-to-market characteristic to 
economic fundamentals (Griffin and Lemmon 2002). 
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by examining how constraints on arbitrage and the intensity of mispricing pressure affect the 
asymmetry of abnormal returns. To our knowledge, our study is the first to perform such a test. 
 
2. Information Environments, Investor Misperceptions, and Short Sale Constraints 
  
 Short arbitrage of overpriced stocks can be viewed as a response by sophisticated 
investors to overoptimistic beliefs of naive investors.6  In order to sell short, an investor must 
borrow shares from an investor who owns them and is willing to lend. The short seller typically 
leaves cash collateral with the lender. In addition to the collateral, equal to 102% of the market 
value of the borrowed shares, Federal Reserve Regulation T requires short sellers to post an 
additional 50% in margin when the lender is a U.S. broker-dealer. The lender pays the short 
seller interest, the rebate rate, on the collateral. The spread between the rebate rate and the 
market interest rate on cash funds, often referred to as the loan fee, is a direct cost to the short 
seller. 
 D’Avolio (2002) documents that 9% of stocks have loan fees above 1% per annum, 
among which about 1% have negative rebate rates. He also finds that the probability of being 
“special” (stocks with high loan fees) decreases with size and institutional ownership, and 
disagreement among investors seem to predict specialness. 
                                               
6Consistent with short interest at least to some extent representing sophisticated arbitrage of mispricing, for both 
NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, short interest is a negative predictor of subsequent abnormal returns (Asquith and 
Meulbroek 1996, Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran 2002, Diether, Lee, and Werner 2009a). Asquith, 
Pathak, and Ritter (2005) report that these effects are present only with equally-weighted portfolios. This implies 
that the effects are strongest for small firms, which suggests that it may be especially informative to investigate 
short-selling and arbitrage using NASDAQ firms. Lamont and Thaler (2003) document that very high costs of short-
selling are associated with extreme price discrepancies between tech firms involved in equity carve-outs and their 
parent firms. Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw (2004) report that costs of short-selling are associated with failures of 
arbitrage between the stock market and options markets, and that stronger constraints on short-selling are associated 
with negative subsequent abnormal returns. Jones and Lamont (2002) find that during 1926-1933, stocks that were 
expensive to short tended to have high valuations and low subsequent returns, consistent with overvaluation. In a 
study of a more recent time period that disentangles the supply and demand for short-selling, Cohen, Diether, and 
Malloy (2007) document that higher demand for short selling is associated with stock price declines in the 
subsequent month.  
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Under current regulations, lenders maintain the right to recall a loan at any time. The 
recalled borrower can either “cover” the short by buying back the shares and returning them to 
the lender, or to reestablish the short at a higher loan fee. A “short squeeze” occurs when 
increasingly optimistic investors compete with recalled borrowers to buy shares being sold by 
lenders. These involuntary closeouts of short trades just when their expected profits are 
nominally at their highest are a source of risk for short sellers. D’Avolio (2002) document that in 
an average month of his sample, 2% (61) of the stocks on loan are recalled. Conditional on 
having been recalled, the mean time before the short can be reestablished with the lender is 23 
trading days.  
For several reasons, we expect greater pressure toward mispricing among NASDAQ than 
among NYSE firms: lower availability of credible public information, smaller relatively holdings 
by institutional (presumably more sophisticated) investors, possible lower quality of earnings, 
and greater variability in the accrual variable that drives mispricing. The constraints, costs, and 
risks of arbitrage (and especially short arbitrage) are likely to be higher among NASDAQ stocks 
than among NYSE stocks owing to greater volatility and lower liquidity, lower institutional 
holdings (and therefore fewer shares available for borrowing, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 2005, 
Nagel 2005), and greater risk of a short squeeze.7  
We expect short arbitrage to be more active when there is an ample supply of loanable 
shares. Several authors document that institutional owners provide the main loan supply of stock, 
and consequently, the level of institutional ownership is a key proxy for ease of short selling 
(Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 2005, Nagel 2005). Furthermore, we expect liquidity, as proxied by 
                                               
7
 A potentially opposing effect is that regulatory restrictions on short selling are stricter on NYSE than on 
NASDAQ. This suggests that after controlling for other characteristics of NYSE and NASDAQ firms, NASDAQ 
firms should be easier to sell short (Fishman, Hong, and Kubik 2006). However, the dominant effect on ease of 
short-selling is likely to come from the large differences between the kinds of firms that trade on the different 
trading venues. 
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size and share turnover, to encourage short-selling by reducing the risk of short squeezes.   
 We expect greater investor disagreement about a stock to be associated with higher short 
interest (see, e.g., D’Avolio 2002), regardless of whether there is short arbitrage of the accrual 
anomaly; we use residual standard deviation, and book-to-market (since there is likely to be 
more disagreement about growth firms than mature firms) to control for differences in investor 
disagreement.  
Institutional holdings, liquidity variables, and residual standard deviation, also provide 
means of testing comparative statics effects on the effectiveness of short arbitrage. Since 
institutional investors in a stock provide the supply of loanable shares, we expect high 
institutional holdings to be associated with lower return asymmetry. Since high liquidity reduces 
the risk of short squeezes, we also expect high Turnover and Size to be associated with lower 
return asymmetry. 
With respect to residual standard deviation, in general we expect stronger mispricing 
pressure can temporarily overwhelm the capital of arbitrageurs. This will especially be the case 
when arbitrage is riskier. The set of investors willing to engage in short selling is relatively 
limited, so that it is easier to overwhelm short arbitrage capital than long capital. Residual 
standard deviation proxies for investor disagreement, which in turn may be associated with 
market misperceptions. Residual standard deviation is also a proxy for risk of arbitrage. For both 
reasons, we predict high residual standard deviation to be associated with greater asymmetry in 
the accrual anomaly. 
   
3. Data Description  
3.1 Sample Characteristics and Variable Measurement 
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Sample Characteristics 
 We obtain monthly short interest data from NASDAQ for the period from June 1988 to 
December 2003, and from NYSE for the period from January 1988 to June 2002.8 NASDAQ 
defines short selling as the selling of a security which the seller does not own, or any sale which 
is completed by the delivery of a security borrowed by the seller. Therefore, short sellers assume 
the risk that they may be forced to buy back the stock at a higher price than the price at which 
they sold short.  
 NASDAQ indicates that member firms are required to report their short positions in all 
accounts in shares, warrants, units, ADRs, and convertible preferred stocks resulting. The short 
positions reported are as of settlement on the 15th of each month, or the preceding business day 
if the 15th is not a business day. The reports must be filed by the second business day after the 
reporting settlement date. Since it takes 3 (or 5 for earlier periods) business days to settle trades, 
the short interest number includes short sales that occurred 3 (or 5) business days prior to the 
15th. NASDAQ publishes the short interest data on the 8th business day after the reporting 
settlement date. The short selling data from the NYSE is also as of settlement on the 15th of the 
month.  
 Monthly stock returns are obtained from CRSP. The sample is first selected by merging 
the monthly CRSP stock returns file with the monthly short interest file according to the stock 
ticker and calendar month. If a match is found, the sample is then matched with the annual 
financial statement data file from Compustat, allowing for a four-month lag between the fiscal 
year end and the month when the short position is reported.9 We end up with a maximum of 
56,527 firm-year observations for the NASDAQ sample and 26,600 firm-year observations for 
                                               
8
 NASDAQ indicates that the February and July 1990 data are missing from their database.  
9
 We also eliminated ADR observations because some of the short interest positions listed on the data file exceeded 
the total number of shares outstanding in CRSP. 
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the NYSE sample. The different test methods impose further varying restrictions on sample size 
depending on accounting variables needed. 
 
Variable Measurement 
 To assist in comparing short positions across time and firms, following Asquith, Pathak, 
and Ritter (2005), we calculate short interest as the short position reported by the NYSE or 
NASDAQ in the fifth month after the fiscal year end divided by the number of shares 
outstanding as reported on CRSP for the same month.10 The four-month gap between the fiscal 
year end and the short position is to ensure that the short–sellers have the accounting information 
available to them prior to taking short positions. 11   
 Prior research has recommended measuring operating accruals from the Statement of 
Cash Flows over measuring them from the Balance Sheet (Collins and Hribar 2002). Because 
our short interest data begins in 1988, we are able to use the Statement of Cash Flows to 
calculate operating accruals as: 
Operating Accruals = (Earnings – CFO) /Average Total Assets 
 To examine whether short–sellers exploit predictable returns associated with a particular 
trading strategy, we first rank firms each fiscal year by the trading screen (Operating Accruals) 
and then assign them in equal numbers into ten portfolios. High decile portfolios contain firms 
                                               
10
 NASDAQ indicates that the monthly short interest information includes the adjustment for stock splits. The 
adjustment to the short interest for stocks that split on or before the reporting settlement date will automatically be 
reflected in the most current reporting period. However, for stock splits that occur after the settlement date, the 
adjustment will be reflected in the following reporting period. We scale short interest by the share outstanding in the 
same month from the CRSP tape. This may introduce error if the split occurs after the settlement date because the 
short interest data will be based on the pre-split shares, whereas CRSP may reflect the post-split shares outstanding.  
11
 We also calculated short interest in two alternative ways. (1) We used only short positions that exceed a cutoff of 
0.5% of shares outstanding as in Dechow et al (2001). Dechow et al argue that large short positions are more likely 
to represent a consensus among short-sellers that a stock is overpriced based on the trading strategy screen, whereas 
low short positions may reflect short-selling behavior based on other considerations (e.g. risk hedging). (2) For each 
firm-fiscal year, we average the monthly short positions from month five through 17 after the fiscal year instead of 
using the month five short position only. The results are generally similar and so are not reported. 
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with the highest accounting screen and Low portfolios contain firms with the lowest accounting 
screen.   
 Table 1 reports the variable statistics for the pooled sample and for the NYSE and 
NASDAQ subsamples. The mean (median) short interest (SI) in the pooled sample is 1.37% 
(0.25%). The mean (median) level of Accruals in the pooled sample is 0.06 (0.04). On average, 
NASDAQ firms have more negative operating accruals than NYSE firms. The means and 
medians are similar in magnitude to those reported in prior literature. Short selling of NYSE 
firms is higher than that of NASDAQ firms by both mean and median measures.12  
  
4. The Accrual Anomaly: Existence and Asymmetry  
 Before testing directly whether short-sellers trade to exploit the accrual anomaly, it is 
important first to verify whether it is present during our sample period. Furthermore, we perform 
return tests of the efficacy of short arbitrage. If short arbitrage is much less effective than long 
arbitrage, we expect an asymmetry between the predictability of returns on the up and down 
sides. In other words, we expect the negative mean abnormal returns after accruals are high to be 
much larger in absolute value than the positive mean abnormal returns after accruals are low. To 
provide a sharper test, we then examine how return asymmetry varies with a proxy for the ease 
of borrowing shares for short-selling.   
                                               
12
 This may reflect that, in general, the shares of NYSE firms are easier and less risky to sell short than those of 
NASDAQ firms. Compared to NYSE firms, NASDAQ firms in our sample have smaller market capitalizations and 
higher growth as measured by book-to-market (the mean difference in BTM is significant using a t test but the 
median difference is not significant in a Wilcoxon test). Although NASDAQ firms have a higher monthly share 
turnover ratio (possibly due to individual investors having a greater desire to speculate in small stocks), their 
monthly trading volume (not reported) is lower. Institutional holdings are also lower for NASDAQ than NYSE 
firms, and residual standard deviation is higher for NASDAQ than NYSE firms. However, caution is needed in 
interpreting the univariate results because several correlated variables change simultaneously when we compare 
across exchanges.  
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 In Table 2, firms are ranked each month for the full sample, NYSE subsample, or 
NASDAQ subsample respectively based upon their operating accruals and then sorted into ten 
deciles.13 Equal-weighted monthly abnormal returns in each decile are computed using the 
characteristic-based portfolio matching procedure used in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers (1997) to control for size, book-to-market, and 12-month stock return momentum.  
 In the Daniel et al (1997) procedure, to form benchmark portfolios all observations are 
first sorted each month into size quintiles, and then within each size quintile further sorted into 
book-to-market quintiles. Stocks are then further sorted within each of these 25 groups into 
quintiles based on the firms past 12-month returns, skipping the most recent month. Stocks are 
weighted equally within each of these 125 groups. To form a size, book-to-market, and 
momentum-hedged return for any stock, we subtract the return of the equal-weighted benchmark 
portfolio to which that stock belongs from the return of the stock. The hedge portfolio consists of 
a long position in the lowest ranked portfolio and an offsetting short position in the highest 
ranked portfolio. All t-statistics reported are based on the time series of monthly mean portfolio 
returns. 
 Table 2 indicates that the hedge returns from taking long positions in low-accrual firms 
and a short position in high-accrual firms are substantial and significant in the full sample, and 
much larger among NASDAQ firms than among NYSE firms. For the sample period 1988-2002, 
the monthly return spread between Low and High accrual deciles in the full sample is 105 basis 
points per month (t = 5.57). This is actually stronger than both the spread on the NYSE of 57 
                                               
13
 We provide results separated by exchange to capture several possible effects, and for comparison with past work 
that has sometimes focused on specific exchanges.  If there is lower investor sophistication among NASDAQ than 
NYSE firms, and higher costs of arbitrage, then we expect greater misvaluation, and therefore stronger return 
anomalies. Furthermore, since short arbitrage is more constrained than long arbitrage and this difference is 
especially strong among NASDAQ firms, there should be greater asymmetry between the upside of return anomalies 
(exploitable by taking long positions) and the downside (exploitable by short selling) among NASDAQ firms. 
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basis points per month (t = 3.55), and on NASDAQ of 99 basis points per month (t = 4.65).14,15 
Thus the mean abnormal hedge returns among NASDAQ firms is more than 70% larger than the 
return spread among NYSE firms. The larger NASDAQ return spread suggests a stronger 
incentive for investors to identify and sell short high-accrual firms on NASDAQ than on NYSE.  
 Earlier research has suggested that trading profits are quite different in the 1999 onwards 
period with the high-tech boom and crash, so we also examine the return spreads from 1988-
1998 and 1999-2002 sub-periods (results not reported in Table 2). Similar return spreads are 
observed in the period 1988-1998, suggesting that the effect is not driven by the post-crash years. 
The effect is weaker for NYSE firms during 1999-2002, and is very strong for NASDAQ firms 
during 1999-2002. 
 On NASDAQ there are no significant long-side profits from holding the lowest accruals 
portfolio. The difference in the hedge returns on NASDAQ versus NYSE derives mainly from 
the much more negative returns earned by NASDAQ firms in the highest accrual decile than 
NYSE firms in the highest accrual decile. For the entire sample period 1988-2002, a long 
position in the highest accrual decile among NASDAQ firms on average loses 80 basis points per 
month (t = –7.62), whereas for NYSE firms the loss is less than half as large, –25 basis points 
per month (t = –2.37).   
 It is not surprising that abnormal profits from the accrual strategy are larger among 
NASDAQ firms than among NYSE firms since, as shown in Table 4, the dispersion of accruals 
is greater among NASDAQ firms. Panel B of Table 4 shows that mean accruals are twice as 
negative for the lowest NASDAQ decile as for the lowest NYSE decile, and 2.4 times larger for 
                                               
14
 Looking across accrual deciles, the pattern is not perfectly monotonic, but the trend in returns is clearly declining 
as Accruals increases. 
15
 A pooled hedge return can be stronger than the hedge return in either of its subsamples. For example, this can 
occur if NYSE firms help the pooled sample achieve high returns in the low accrual decile, whereas NASDAQ firms 
help the pooled sample achieve low returns in the high accrual decile. 
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the highest NASDAQ decile than the highest NYSE decile. This results in significantly larger 
High-Low interdecile spread in accruals on NASDAQ than on NYSE. Thus, the evidence in 
Table 2 does not provide any indication that there is a greater sensitivity of misvaluation to 
accruals on NASDAQ than on NYSE. In this sense the accrual anomaly seems to be about 
equally strong on the two trading venues, a conclusion borne out in unreported multivariate 
return regressions.  
 Returning to Table 2, the bottom row labeled –(H+L) is the mean return on a portfolio 
that is short on both the highest and lowest characteristic deciles. This is a measure of the 
asymmetry between upside and downside profits from the hedge strategy. A larger absolute 
value of the abnormal returns of the high portfolio (H) compared to those of the low portfolio (L) 
will increase –(H + L). The asymmetry is significant and substantial in the full sample (43 basis 
points per month, t = 2.26); the negative mean abnormal return of –74 basis points per month in 
the highest accrual decile is more than twice as large in absolute value as the positive mean 
return of 31 basis points per month among firms in the lowest accrual decile. However, this 
asymmetry comes mainly from the significant and large effect on NASDAQ (61 basis points per 
month, t = 2.86). The asymmetry is insignificant on NYSE. The negative mean abnormal return 
of –80 basis points in the highest accrual decile on NASDAQ is more than four times as large in 
absolute value as the positive mean return of 19 basis points firms in the lowest accrual decile. 
These findings suggest that short-selling constraints make short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly 
less effective on NASDAQ than on the NYSE. 
 However, short sale constraints are not the only possible source of return asymmetry. To 
identify the source more sharply, we examine the relation of asymmetry to constraints on short 
selling. As discussed in the introduction, past research has shown that greater institutional 
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shareholding encourages short selling, because institutional investors are more likely to lend 
shares. Greater ease of short arbitrage should, in equilibrium, reduce the return asymmetry 
associated with an anomaly.  
Table 3 examines the determinants of the abnormal return asymmetry in the accrual 
anomaly. Each month, firms are first sorted into decile portfolios according to the value of 
Accruals in the previous fiscal year. We then separately rank the firms within the highest accrual 
decile (denoted by H) and the lowest accrual decile (denoted by L) according to the level of 
institutional ownership. We then form 2-firm portfolios by selecting one firm from the highest 
accrual decile (denote it H) and the other firm from the lowest accrual decile (denote it L), 
matching by their institutional ownership ranks within their Accrual decile portfolios. Abnormal 
Return Asymmetry is defined as the difference between the monthly abnormal return of shorting 
H and that of longing L.16 We then examine how it is associated with institutional ownership and 
other possible constraints on short selling. 
The relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and the ease of short selling is 
likely to be nonlinear. Once the number of shares available for borrowing reaches a sufficient 
level, IO is likely to be less of a binding constraint for short selling. We allow for non-linearity in 
alternative ways. In Model 1, a log transformation of IO is used, while in Models 2 and 3, a 
dummy variable (LowIO) is constructed based upon whether institutional ownership exceeds 5% 
(Model 2) or the firm-month falls within the lowest IO decile (Model 3).  
For all three model specifications, we find low institutional ownership is strongly 
associated with greater abnormal return asymmetry, after controlling for liquidity measures 
                                               
16
 A different possible definition of asymmetry would be the difference in differences between H – M (where M is 
the return on the middle two deciles) and M – L. Since (M – L) – (H – M) =   – (H  + L) + 2M, this definition is very 
similar to our – (H  + L) measure. Since we expect the effect of short selling or short selling constraints to be 
primarily on the H portfolio, the – (H  + L)   measure seems more parsimonious. 
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(Size, Turnover) that may be related to the ease of short-selling, firm growth/valuation (BTM), 
and the standard deviation of market model residuals (STDRES), a measure of potential investor 
disagreement. The results are statistically significant, and of substantial economic magnitude. 
Specifically, Model 2 shows that when institutional ownership falls from above 5% to below 5%, 
there is on average a 2.2% per month (26.4% annualized) increase in abnormal return 
asymmetry. This evidence indicates that short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly is more limited 
among firms with low institutional holdings.   
We also expect liquidity and investor disagreement to affect the effectiveness of short 
arbitrage. Ceteris paribus, illiquid firms (those with small size and low share turnover) have 
higher risk of short squeezes, which discourages short arbitrage and consequently should lead to 
greater return asymmetry. We find strong empirical support for this prediction: both Size and 
Turnover are significantly negatively associated with return asymmetry. For example, in Model 
2, the coefficients on lnSize and Turnover are –0.0051 (t = –3.06) and –0.1104 (t = –8.44), 
respectively. Since the interquartile range (IQR) is 2.28 for lnSize and 0.02 for Turnover, these 
estimates show that as lnSize (Turnover) increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, 
there is on average a 1.16% (2.22%) per month decrease in abnormal return asymmetry. This 
evidence highlights the importance of liquidity in improving the effectiveness of short arbitrage.    
Furthermore, we hypothesize that firms with higher residual volatility (STDRES) are 
riskier to arbitrage, and that greater investor disagreement (also proxied by STDRES) tend to be 
have stronger mispricing pressure, which can exhaust the market’s capacity for short-arbitrage. 
For both reasons, we predict STDRES to be associated with abnormal return asymmetry in the 
accrual anomaly. Consistent with this prediction, we find the coefficient on STDRES is 
significantly positive in all three models (in Model 2, for example, b = 0.3858, t = 2.89). With an 
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interquartile range of 0.024, this estimate implies an average increase of 0.93% (11.16% 
annualized) in abnormal return asymmetry when residual volatility increases from the 25th 
percentile to the 75th percentile. Similarly, we find that book-to-market ratio (BTM) is negatively 
associated with abnormal return asymmetry (b = –0.0049, t = –1.69 in Model 2), possibly 
because investors are likely to have more disagreement about growth firms than mature firms. 
 
5. The Relationship Between Short Interest and Accruals: Univariate Tests 
 Evidence from short interest provides further insight into the nature of short arbitrage. An 
anomaly that is strong on the down- as well as the upside should be the target of strong short 
arbitrage, unless even sophisticated investors have failed to recognize the anomaly, or barriers to 
borrowing stock in order to sell short are severe. Strong short arbitrage, i.e., a strong relation 
between the return predictor and short interest, suggests that some investors are highly aware of 
the anomaly, and are profiting thereby to the extent that the supply of loanable shares permits.  
 We first examine short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly (Subsection 5.1). Subsection 5.2 
discusses how the availability of loanable shares affects the extent of short arbitrage. Subsection 
5.3 examines the relation of changes in Accrual to changes in short interest.  
 
5.1 Short Arbitrage of the Accrual Anomaly 
 As discussed in the introduction, for the 1990-98 period past research has not detected a 
statistically significant univariate correlation among NYSE firms between short interest and the 
level of operating accruals (Richardson 2003). Given the relatively short time period of this 
finding, it is important to test this using our 1988 to 2003 sample that includes the stock market 
and high-tech sector bust as well as the preceding market boom. Table 4 Panel A reports mean 
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short positions for NYSE firms from 1988 to 2002, for NASDAQ firms from 1988 to 2003 and 
for the pooled sample.17  
 For convenient comparison with previous research, we begin with the analysis by trading 
venue. In our longer sample period, there is some indication that investors do engage in short 
arbitrage of the accrual anomaly among NYSE firms. The difference in short interest between 
the highest and lowest accrual deciles is 0.40, which is non-negligible, and has a t-statistic of 
1.80, which is significant at the 10% level.18 As we will discuss below, more powerful 
multivariate tests more strongly confirm short arbitrage even among NYSE firms.   
 Panel A also shows that in the 1988-2003 period, the univariate results for NASDAQ 
firms are stronger. The mean short interest in the highest accrual decile is 1.79, which is over 
40% higher than the mean short interest of the lowest accrual decile, 1.26. Thus, the difference of 
0.53, which is significant at the 5% level (t = 2.40), is economically substantial. Investors seem 
to be actively engaged in the arbitrage of overvalued, high-accruals firms through short-selling.  
 Returning to the pooled sample, short interest is increasing with accruals. The mean short 
interest in the highest accrual decile is 1.86, whereas in the lowest accrual decile mean short 
interest is only 1.37. The difference of 0.49 is significant at the 5% level (t = 2.27), and is 
quantitatively substantial relative to the levels of short interest in the different deciles. In other 
words, variation in accruals has a substantial effect on mean short interest. The findings above 
indicate that this effect in the overall sample comes more from NASDAQ than from NYSE 
firms. 
Why is short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly stronger for NASDAQ than for NYSE? 
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 The sample periods are the maximum for which we have short interest data from the exchanges. The qualitative 
results are similar for median changes. 
18
 The point estimates are non-monotonic, with short interest higher in the lowest accrual decile than in decile 9. 
However, the difference between the two is not statistically significant.   
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The evidence from Table 2 that the accrual anomaly is much stronger on NASDAQ than on 
NYSE suggests a simple reason, that misperceptions on the part of naïve investors are stronger 
on NASDAQ. Such misperceptions, by creating greater pressure for mispricing, should increase 
the incentive of sophisticated investors to engage in arbitrage activity.   
 Specifically, on NASDAQ accruals have much higher dispersion on NASDAQ than on 
NYSE. Table 4 Panel B shows that the bottom decile of accruals on NASDAQ has a 
significantly lower (more negative) level of mean accruals than the corresponding decile on 
NYSE (difference –0.21, t = –7.85). Similarly, the top decile of accruals on NASDAQ has a 
significantly higher level of mean accruals than the corresponding decile on NYSE (difference 
0.12, t = 11.38). Thus, the High minus Low decile spread in mean accruals is much larger on 
NASDAQ than on NYSE (difference in differences of 0.34, t = 16.45). 
 If there are fixed costs of short arbitrage strategies, such as the costs of identifying 
appropriate positions to take, then we expect short interest to be concentrated among the most 
overpriced stocks. Consistent with this, in Table 4 short interest is substantially concentrated in 
the top accrual decile (Decile 10). In the pooled analysis and in the NASDAQ subsample, a fairly 
large fraction of the High-minus-Low difference in short interest would still be present even if 
we compare Decile 10 with Decile 9 instead of comparing Decile 10 with Decile 1. (For the 
NYSE subsample, the 10 – 9 decile difference is actually larger than the 10 – 1 difference, 
though not significantly so.)  
 
5.2 The Effect of Institutional Holdings on Short Arbitrage of the Accrual Anomaly  
 As discussed earlier, institutional holdings is a key indicator of the supply of loanable 
shares. We therefore expect stronger short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly among firms with 
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high institutional holdings. The multivariate analysis of Section 6 explicitly tests for this 
possibility. But even without including a full set of controls, we can see some signs of this effect.  
 Table 5 shows that among firms in the lowest institutional ownership decile, the mean 
difference in short interest between the highest Accrual decile portfolio and the lowest Accrual 
decile portfolio is an insignificant –0.010 (t = –0.92), whereas in the highest institutional 
ownership decile the mean difference in short interest between the highest Accrual decile 
portfolio and the lowest Accrual decile portfolio is a substantial 1.976 (t = 5.79). The difference 
in differences between the highest and lowest institutional ownership deciles is also a large and 
significant 1.986 (t = 6.12). 
 The differences in short interest between the highest versus lowest accrual decile 
portfolios across high versus low institutional holding are very highly significant. These findings 
suggest that it is important in multivariate tests of short arbitrage to allow for an interaction of 
accruals with institutional holdings. 
 
5.3 The Effect of Changes in Accruals 
 As discussed earlier, short interest is likely to be influenced by variables other than 
accruals, such as the degree of disagreement and the extent of institutional ownership, both of 
which are likely to vary across industries. To the extent that these other influences are fixed over 
time, an analysis in changes can filter out such extraneous effects, potentially reducing the noise 
of the test. Table 6 provides evidence that increases over time in accruals are associated with 
increases in short interest. 
 In the pooled sample, a move into the highest Accruals decile relative to the preceding 
year is associated with an average increase in short interest of 0.5082. This change in short 
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interest is significantly different from zero (t = 6.88). It is possible that cross-decile shifts in 
Accruals are associated with shifts in other determinants of short interest. To control for this 
possibility, we use as a benchmark for comparison the mean change in short interest in response 
to cross-decile shifts among Accruals deciles 1 through 9 (10 being the highest decile)..A 
Satterthwaite two-sample test of mean difference (assuming unequal variance) indicates that a 
move into the highest Accruals decile is associated with a significantly higher short interest 
increase than in the benchmark case (difference = 0.3154, t = 5.09). 
 Furthermore, the effect of accruals changes is very different among firms with high 
institutional holdings (easier short-selling) and low institutional holdings. Within the bottom two 
IO deciles, moving into the top Accruals decile has no significant effect on short interest. In 
sharp contrast, in the top two IO deciles, moving into the highest Accruals decile has a strong 
and highly significant positive effect on short interest of 1.4067 (t = 4.35) for decile 9, and 
1.4688 (t = 4.90) for decile 10. The effect on short interest of a move within Accruals deciles 1 
through 9 is much smaller, so that the difference in the effect on short interest of a move into the 
top Accruals decile versus the benchmark is also strong and significant 1.1993 (t = 5.69) for IO 
decile 9, and 0.9477 (t = 3.48) for IO decile 10.19 
 Figure 1 illustrates changes of short interest position around the time of a move into the 
highest Accruals decile. Consistent with the findings of Table 6, on average there is an increase 
in short interest when the firm-year moves into the highest Accruals decile. Among firms with 
high institutional holdings (IO deciles 9 and 10), we observe notable jumps in short interest from 
year –1 to year 0, in contrast to the nearly flat lines for firms with low institutional holdings (IO 
deciles 1 and 2). Moreover, Figure 1 shows that a move out of the highest Accruals decile is 
associated with decreases in short interest only for firms among the highest IO decile. 
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 The tests that split by IO have the additional data requirement that IO observations be available.  
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6. Short Arbitrage of the Accrual Anomaly: Multivariate Tests 
 A disadvantage of an analysis in changes is that some of the cross-sectional differences in 
short-interest are due to cross-sectional differences in accruals, the effects we would like to 
detect. More importantly, a univariate analysis only filters out extraneous fixed effects, not time-
varying ones.   
 Multivariate testing of whether there is short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly is 
important for two reasons. The first is that there are several determinants of short interest in 
general which need not derive from arbitrage of these anomalies. The second reason is that the 
accruals variable is correlated with other return predictors. In consequence, short arbitrage of one 
anomaly (e.g., momentum, or book-to-market) could induce a correlation between short interest 
and accruals, even if no investor is basing a decision to go short accruals. Thus, to verify short 
arbitrage of the accrual anomaly we need to control for other return predictors. For example, 
there is indeed evidence that short-interest is correlated with firms’ book-to-market ratios, 
suggesting that there is short-arbitrage of the ‘value’ (book-to-market) effect (Dechow et al 
2001).  
We therefore perform multivariate tests which explicitly control both for other 
determinants of short interest, and for other known predictors of stock returns. This allows us to 
verify whether the apparent arbitrage of the accrual anomaly found in our univariate tests (both 
in levels and changes) is actually due to arbitrageurs trading in response to accruals.  
To control for other general determinants of short interest, we include in our regressions 
measures of institutional ownership, residual return volatility, book-to-market, size, share 
turnover ratio and a dummy variable for trading venue. When institutional ownership is high, the 
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stock is easier to borrow for purposes of short-selling (Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 2005, Nagel 
2005), so we control for institutional holdings (IO). Higher liquidity also tends to make a stock 
easier to sell short, so we control for firm size (LnSize) and monthly share turnover ratio 
(Turnover). High residual volatility makes short arbitrage riskier, so we include a residual 
volatility measure (STDRES) as a control (see Pontiff 1996, Duan, Hu, and McClean 2009, 
Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin 2006). 
A general propensity toward disagreement is another source of demand for shares to sell 
short (D’Avolio 2002). If high accruals happen to be associated with firms that have greater 
disagreement, this would induce an association between accruals and short interest even if no 
investors were selling short based upon the level of accruals. We therefore control for some 
general proxies for investor disagreement. High residual volatility may allow greater room for 
disagreement among investors, which provides a distinct interpretation of the residual volatility 
control. In addition, we include book-to-market (BTM), which is an inverse proxy for 
disagreement if there is more disagreement about growth (low book-to-market) firms than about 
mature firms.   
We also include a control for the trading venue, using a dummy variable NYSE which is 
equal to 1 if the firm is NYSE-traded and 0 if it is a NASDAQ firm. Our proxies for liquidity and 
propensity to disagreement are imperfect, and the trading venue can offer additional relevant 
information. For example, Fishman, Hong, and Kubik (2007) discuss features of the trading 
institutions on the different exchanges which, ceteris paribus, make short-selling easier on 
NASDAQ than on NYSE. On the other hand, the kind of company that is able to qualify for, and 
chooses to be traded upon, the NYSE may have greater liquidity and a more transparent 
information environment. Furthermore, NYSE trading itself affects liquidity.  
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When shares are easy to borrow, it becomes easier to engage in short arbitrage against 
high accruals. Past literature has identified institutional holdings as a key indicator of the 
availability of shares for borrowing. We therefore predict that high institutional holdings should 
be associated with stronger short arbitrage. To test this prediction, we include interactions of IO 
with Accrual (in addition to including IO as a main effect).  
 The book-to-market and size variables are useful as controls for a second reason, their 
documented ability to predict future returns. Since momentum is a strong stock return predictor, 
we also include a momentum variable, measured as the compounded past returns from months  
–12 to –2 relative to the short interest position month.  
 We saw in Section 5.1 that there was a nonlinear relationship in which short interest was 
concentrated especially in the top accrual decile, and that conceptually this makes sense because 
when there are fixed costs of short arbitrage, it is most profitable to focus on the most overvalued 
firms. (We also saw evidence in Subsection 5.4 that moving into the top accrual decile was 
associated with an increase in short interest.) To capture the nonlinear nature of short arbitrage, 
in our multivariate tests we use dummy variables that are equal to one when the firm’s accruals 
are in the top decile, and zero otherwise.  
 Table 7 describes multivariate regressions of short interest on HighAccrual, as well as 
year fixed effects, the six control variables discussed above, and the interaction of HighAccrual 
with institutional ownership variables. The non-linear effect of institutional ownership on the 
ease of short selling is allowed for in alternative specifications as in Table 3.  To test for 
significance, t-statistics are calculated based on clustered robust standard errors which adjust for 
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within-cluster autocorrelations clustered by firm (Petersen 2009).20  
 Table 7 provides strong evidence of short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly, and of 
stronger short arbitrage activity when more shares are available to borrow. These tests control for 
other anomalies and determinants of short interest. Model 1 includes HighAccrual but not the 
interaction term. HighAccrual has a highly significant positive coefficient, which indicates that it 
is incrementally associated with greater short interest.  
 Model 2 shows that the effect of HighAccrual on short interest is significantly greater 
when shares are more easily borrowed, as proxied by institutional shareholding. The coefficient 
on HighAccrual is an insignificant –0.0046 (t = –0.05), suggesting that when institutional 
ownership is as low as 1% (lnIO = 0), there is no evidence of short sellers exploiting the accrual 
anomaly. However, the coefficient on HighAccrual*lnIO is a highly significant 0.2891 (t = 7.08), 
implying that as the constraint on loanable shares is relaxed, there is a significant increase in 
short selling targeting toward high accrual firms.21  
Models 3 and 4 generate similar findings. Short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly is 
extremely strong among firms with high institutional holdings, but the effect is significantly 
weaker when institutional ownership drops below 5%, or when the firm-month is in the lowest 
IO decile. The greater strength of the evidence of short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly in the 
multivariate tests indicates that it is important to control for other determinants of short interest.  
To assess the quantitative importance of short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly, we 
perform calculations based upon Model 1. We calculate that holding constant other variables 
(firm size, share turnover, book-to-market, residual volatility, institutional ownership, and return 
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 As an alternative test, we also applied estimator of Thompson (2006), which allows for clustering by both firm 
and year (serial correlation and cross-correlation). The results were similar. We also performed tests that omit penny 
stocks (those with price less than $5). The results were qualitatively similar. 
21
 The results are qualitatively the same if we add an interactive control variable HighAccrual*lnSize to isolate the 
incremental effect of institutional ownership. 
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momentum), on average the effect of a firm being inside rather than outside the top accrual 
decile increases short interest increases by 0.76%. To provide some benchmarks for comparison, 
the mean (median) short interest in the sample is 1.37% (0.25%), with a standard deviation of 
3.34%. Thus, the effect of accruals on short interest is economically important.  
As a further sensitivity analysis, in Table 8 we regress the change in short interest on the 
change in HighAccrual, and the changes in each of the controls.22 Change in HighAccrual 
remains a significant incremental predictor of changes in short interest. This evidence indicates 
that the evidence of short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly that we have identified is not just 
cross-sectional; it is present even in a pure time series test. 
Taken together, the short-interest findings of Sections 4-6 indicate that, in contrast with 
some previous literature, there is short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly; and that this activity is 
much stronger among stocks that are easier to borrow, i.e., stocks which have high levels of 
institutional holdings.  
 
7. Conclusion 
  There is an active policy debate about whether short selling is in large part a means of 
manipulating stock prices, or whether it has a valuable economic function. Proponents of mild 
regulation of short-selling argue that short arbitrage is crucial for preventing firms from 
becoming highly overvalued. In this paper, using accruals as a proxy for market misvaluation, 
we test whether there is short selling targeted at overvalued firms, and whether short arbitrage is 
effective in reducing overvaluation.   
 We therefore test whether short-sellers trade against the accrual anomaly, and whether 
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 We consider a specification without interaction terms, because the change in Accrual * IO from t to t + 1 includes 
levels, not just changes, in IO and Accrual. This would leave firm fixed effects in the regression, which defeats the 
purpose of running a regression in changes.  
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such short arbitrage is successful, or whether the anomaly is much stronger on the short side than 
on the long side. To establish causality, we perform further tests of the comparative statics of 
short arbitrage: the effect of several factors (such as the availability of loanable stock, liquidity, 
and investor disagreement) that affect the need for or the ease of short arbitrage on short 
arbitrage activity and on the degree of asymmetry in mispricing.  
 We confirm the accrual anomaly in our sample, with higher hedge returns for NASDAQ 
firms than for NYSE firms. Furthermore, consistent with strong limits to short arbitrage, there is 
asymmetry in the accrual anomaly. This asymmetry is greater for firms with low institutional 
holdings (for which shares are hard to borrow for short selling), for illiquid firms (for which 
shareholders are at greater risk for short squeezes), for firms with high residual volatility (which 
have higher disagreement and mispricing which potentially can overwhelm short arbitrage 
capital) and on NASDAQ rather than NYSE (probably because NASDAQ firms tend to be more 
prone to mispricing and harder to sell short). Specifically, the accrual anomaly is asymmetric 
only for firms in the lowest decile of institutional holdings—the firms with the lowest supply of 
loanable shares for short-selling.    
Our tests of whether short arbitrageurs target high accrual firms provide a sharp contrast 
with some previous work finding no arbitrage of the accrual anomaly in a more restricted 
sample. Base on univariate tests, Richardson (2003) found no statistically significant short 
arbitrage of the operating accrual anomaly among NYSE firms. We show that over a more 
extended sample period that includes the high-tech sector bust as well as the boom that preceded 
it, there is evidence of short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly even in univariate tests for NYSE 
firms.  Furthermore, from year to year when a firm moves into the top accrual decile, short 
interest on average increases by a highly significant and very substantial economic magnitude, 
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and the mean increase is significant even among NYSE firms.  
We use several controls for the determinants of short interest, including size, share 
turnover, book-to-market, residual standard deviation, and institutional ownership that recent 
research has suggested are important. It is also crucial to control for other known return 
predictors, such as 12-month return momentum, to evaluate the incremental short-selling activity 
specifically associated with the accrual anomaly. In multivariate tests that include these controls, 
there is highly significant evidence of short-arbitrage of the accrual anomaly.  
As a further test for whether the relation between accruals and short selling is causal, we 
perform a comparative statics test by examining whether greater ease of borrowing stock affects 
the extent of short arbitrage. We document a strong interaction effect between accruals and 
institutional holdings; short arbitrage is much stronger in firms held heavily by institutions (for 
which shares are more available for borrowing). 
 We expect the pressure for mispricing to be greater on NASDAQ than on NYSE, but 
costs of short arbitrage also tend to be higher among NASDAQ firms. So it is not obvious 
whether which trading venue should have more short arbitrage activity.  But owing to both 
greater mispricing pressure and the greater costs and constraints to short-selling among 
NASDAQ firms, we unambiguously expect stronger downside anomalies, and therefore greater 
return asymmetry on NASDAQ than on NYSE.  
In both univariate and multivariate tests, we find that short-arbitrage targeted at high-
accrual firms is stronger on NASDAQ than on NYSE. Consistent with greater extremes in the 
pressure toward misvaluation on NASDAQ, we find that there is a larger variation in accruals 
across NASDAQ firms than across NYSE firms. Despite the heavy short arbitrage activity on 
NASDAQ, the constraints or costs of short-selling (such as limited supply of loanable shares, 
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risk, and illiquidity) are strong enough on NASDAQ to limit arbitrage, creating significant return 
asymmetry.     
 Overall, the evidence in this paper paints a picture in which short selling has only a 
degree of success in eliminating the downside of the accrual anomalies. There is strong evidence 
that short sellers bet against high accrual firms. But asymmetry in the accrual anomaly remains, 
and this asymmetry is greater for firms with low institutional holdings (for which shares are hard 
to borrow for short selling), for illiquid firms (for which shareholders are at greater risk for short 
squeezes), for firms with high residual volatility (whose greater risk and disagreement/mispricing 
pressure can potentially overwhelm short arbitrage capital), and on NASDAQ (which has less 
liquid firms and firms that are more prone to mispricing) rather than NYSE.  
   There is a general debate in the accounting and asset pricing literatures about whether 
anomalies represent market inefficiencies, rational risk premia, or some form of data snooping or 
measurement error. Our findings that there is short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly, but that this 
short arbitrage is not entirely effective, provides a new and distinct form of evidence that the 
accrual anomaly does indeed represent a market inefficiency.  
 As a policy matter, our findings suggest that trading venues or regulatory policies that 
allow short selling to be cheaper and less risky can improve market efficiency. The relaxation by 
the Security and Exchange Commission of the “uptick rule” restricting short sales is a possible 
example (Diether, Lee, and Werner 2009b, and Jakab 2008). Such improvements may potentially 
help protect investors from the hazards of trading overpriced stocks.   
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Table 1 
Description of Sample Statistics 
 
Variable Pooled Sample NYSE Sample NASDAQ Sample Test for Difference (NYSE − NASDAQ) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-statistic Wilcoxon Z 
SI (%) 1.37 0.25 1.63 0.54 1.25 0.15 14.65 54.90 
Accruals 
−0.06 −0.04 −0.05 −0.04 −0.06 −0.05 16.32 6.22 
Size ($m) 1,730 127 4,284 794 526 59 39.99 162.20 
BTM 0.64 0.53 0.56 0.54 0.67 0.53 −4.93 0.87 
Turnover 0.026 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.036 0.011 −18.51 −107.74 
STDRES 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 −142.28 −134.54 
IO (%) 33.22 29.30 46.97 48.66 26.19 19.95 107.98 100.93 
Momentum 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.00 -6.89 16.27 
Sample Size 83,127 26,600 56,527 
  
Period 01/1988 – 12/2003 01/1988 – 06/2002 06/1988 – 12/2003   
 
 
Notes: 
 
SI denotes Short Interest level, calculated as the short position four months after the fiscal year end (as reported on 
NASDAQ or NYSE monthly short interest files) divided by the number of shares outstanding in the same month as 
reported by CRSP, then multiply by 100 to express as a percentage. 
 
Accruals are calculated as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items (item 123) and cash flows 
from operations (item 308) as reported on the statement of cash flows. This variable is scaled by average total assets. 
 
Size is market value of stockholders’ equity, calculated as the number of shares outstanding (item 25) multiplied by 
the fiscal year end price (item 199). The unit is millions of dollars. 
 
BTM denotes Book-to-Market, calculated as the book value of common equity (item 60) divided by Size.  
 
Turnover is monthly share turnover, calculated as monthly stock trading volume in millions of dollars divided by 
Size. 
  
STDRES is the standard deviation of the Market Model residuals for daily returns over a one-year window ending 
one month prior to the month of reported short position. 
 
IO denotes Institutional Ownership, calculated as the total number of shares held by institutions divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding, then multiplied by 100 to express as a percentage. 
 
Momentum is the compounded monthly return for the window (−12, −2) from the short position report month. 
 
Satterthwaite t-statistics for the test of difference in means are reported assuming unequal variance. Wilcoxon Z 
statistics are reported for the rank sum test of difference in medians.  
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Table 2 
Average Monthly Abnormal Returns for Accruals Portfolios 
One Year after Portfolio Formation 
 
 Pooled NYSE NASDAQ 
Lowest Accruals Decile 0.0031* 
(1.87) 
0.0032*** 
(2.64) 
0.0019 
(1.03) 
Highest Accruals Decile –0.0074*** (–8.48) 
–0.0025*** 
(–2.37) 
–0.0080*** 
(–7.62) 
Hedge Return 
(L – H) 
0.0105*** 
(5.57) 
0.0057*** 
(3.55) 
0.0099*** 
(4.65) 
Return Asymmetry 
 –(H + L) 
0.0043*** 
(2.26) 
–0.0007 
(–0.49) 
0.0061*** 
(2.86) 
Average Number of Stocks  
Per Month 430 158 272 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Table 1 notes define Accruals. Firms are first sorted into decile portfolios according to their values of Accruals. 
Decile portfolios are formed monthly based on Accruals of the previous fiscal year, with a minimum four-month lag 
between the fiscal year end and the portfolio formation month.  
 
To facilitate comparison, the sample period is from 1988 to 2002 for all cases. 
 
The monthly abnormal return for any individual stock is calculated by subtracting the equal-weighted return of a 
benchmark portfolio matched by size, book-to-market and momentum from the raw return of the stock. The equal-
weighted abnormal return for each portfolio is then averaged across the decile. The hedge portfolio consists of a 
long position in the lowest ranked portfolio and an offsetting short position in the highest ranked portfolio.  
 
The time series averages of the monthly portfolio returns are reported along with their t-statistics over the periods 
shown. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are calculated based on a time series of 180 monthly portfolio 
abnormal stock returns (Fama-MacBeth approach).  
 
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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Table 3 
Multivariate Analysis of Abnormal Return Asymmetry 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is Abnormal Return Asymmetry. The monthly abnormal return for any individual 
stock is calculated by subtracting the equal-weighted return of a benchmark portfolio matched by size, book-to-
market and momentum from the raw return of the stock. Each month, firms are first sorted into decile portfolios 
according to their values of Accruals in the previous fiscal year, then 2-firm portfolios are formed by selecting one 
firm from the highest accrual decile (denote it H) and the other firm from the lowest accrual decile (denote it L), 
matching by their relative rank order in institutional ownership within the monthly Accrual decile portfolio. 
Abnormal Return Asymmetry is measured as the difference between the monthly abnormal return of shorting H and 
that of longing L. IO is the average institutional ownership for the 2-firm portfolio in the month. lnIO is the log 
transformation of IO.  In Model 2, LowIO is defined as a dummy variable taking value 1 if IO < 5%, 0 otherwise. In 
Model 3, LowIO is defined as a dummy variable taking value 1 if the 2-firm portfolio ranks among the lowest IO 
decile for the month, 0 otherwise. See Table 1 for control variable definitions. To mitigate the influence of the 
extreme values, all control variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. The results are qualitatively the same 
without winsorization. There are 65,179 portfolio-months in the sample (requiring non-missing institutional 
ownership data reduces the sample size), but the t-statistics reported in the bracket are computed based on Fama-
MacBeth approach using a time series of 190 months.  
 
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
  IO < 5% lowest IO decile 
lnIO −0.0070*** 
  
 (−5.01)   
LowIO  0.0219*** 0.0191*** 
  (5.13) (4.07) 
lnSize −0.0040** −0.0051*** −0.0064*** 
 (−2.25) (−3.06) (−3.77) 
Turnover −1.1066*** −1.1104*** −1.0928*** 
 (−8.43) (−8.44) (−8.36) 
STDRES 0.3431** 0.3858*** 0.3972*** 
 (2.56) (2.89) (2.96) 
BTM −0.0051* −0.0049* −0.0060** 
 (−1.72) (−1.69) (−2.08) 
Constant 0.0179 0.0306** 0.0383*** 
 (1.16) (2.09) (2.64) 
N 190 190 190 
Adjusted R-squared 0.020 0.021 0.020 
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Table 4 
Univariate Analysis of Short Interest Positions (SI) across Accruals Portfolios 
 
 
Panel A: Average short interest positions across accruals deciles 
 
 
Panel B: Comparison of mean accruals spread across NYSE and NASDAQ (1988-2002) 
 
 
Notes: Observations with missing Accruals are excluded. The pooled sample in Panel A has 73,014 firm-year 
observations. The sample size is 23,967 for Panel B, 49,047 for Panel C and 70,337 for Panel D.  For each panel, 
observations are ranked annually and sorted into accruals deciles. Each year cross-sectional means of accruals are 
computed for each decile. The time series means and t-statistics are reported.  See Table 1 notes for variable 
definitions.  
 
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 Low 2 9 High High – Low 
(t-statistic) 
Sorting on Accruals 
Average Short Interest Positions  
Pooled Sample 1.37 1.32 1.51 1.86 0.49** 
(2.27) 
NYSE  1.90 1.64 1.61 2.30 0.40 
(1.80)* 
NASDAQ 1.26 1.18 1.41 1.79 0.53** 
(2.40) 
 Low High High – Low 
Sorting on Accruals 
Average Accruals  
NYSE (1) –0.21 0.09 0.30 
NASDAQ (2) –0.42 0.21 0.63 
Difference: (2) – (1) 
 (t-statistic) 
–0.21*** 
(–7.85) 
0.12*** 
(11.38) 
0.34*** 
(16.45) 
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Table 5 
Analysis of Short Interest Positions across Accruals and IO Deciles 
 
 
 
Notes:  
Table 1 notes define Accruals and IO. Table 2 notes define portfolio formation process.  Satterthwaite t-tests of 
difference in means are performed assuming unequal variance.  
 
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Highest Accruals 
decile portfolio 
Other Accruals 
decile portfolio 
Difference:   
Highest – Other 
Lowest IO decile 0.608 0.618 –0.010 
Highest IO decile 4.912 2.936 1.976*** 
Difference: High – Low  4.304*** 2.318*** 1.986*** 
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Table 6 
Changes in Short Interest in Response to Changes in the Decile Rank of Accruals 
 
 
                         
 
Notes: Table 1 notes define Accruals and IO. Firms are ranked each year by Accruals and assigned in equal numbers 
into decile portfolios. Decile 10 contains firms with the highest Accruals. “Moving into the highest Accrual Decile” 
denotes that the firm’s Accruals decile rank is 10 in the current year and less than 10 in the previous year. “Cross-
Decile Shifts within Accruals Decile 1 through 9” denotes that the firm’s Accruals decile rank changes from the 
previous year but remains less than 10 both before and after the change. The pooled sample does not require non-
missing data on institutional ownership. 
 
Mean changes in short interest position from year to year are reported. The t-statistics reported in the first row of the 
table tests the hypothesis that the mean change is different from zero. In the last row, the reported t-statistics are 
calculated based on a Satterthwaite two-sample test of mean differences assuming unequal variance. 
 
 *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pooled 
Sample 
Lowest IO 
Decile 
IO Decile 
2 
IO Decile 
9 
Highest IO 
Decile 
Moving into  
the highest Accruals 
Decile 
0.5082*** 
(6.88) 
–0.0424 
(–1.05) 
0.0020 
(0.01) 
1.4067*** 
(4.35) 
1.4688*** 
(4.90) 
Cross-Decile Shifts 
within Accruals 
Deciles 1 through 9 
0.1656 0.0292 –0.0352 0.2074 0.5211 
Difference 0.3154*** (5.09) 
–0.0716 
(–0.44) 
0.0372 
(0.31) 
1.1993*** 
(5.69) 
0.9477*** 
(3.48) 
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Table 7 
Multivariate Analysis of Short Interest Levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
   IO < 5% lowest IO decile 
HighAccrual 0.7634*** –0.0046 0.9204*** 0.8464*** 
 (10.14) (–0.05) (10.36) (10.25) 
lnIO 0.2881*** 0.2514***   
 (15.66) (13.49)   
HighAccrual*lnIO  0.2891***   
  (7.08)   
LowIO   –0.5308*** –0.5530*** 
   (–9.26) (–8.83) 
HighAccrual*LowIO   –0.8441*** –0.7483*** 
   (–7.14) (–5.33) 
lnSize 0.4361*** 0.4372*** 0.4962*** 0.5072*** 
 (19.75) (19.83) (23.39) (24.42) 
Turnover 8.1861*** 8.2060*** 8.0682*** 8.0780*** 
 (15.14) (15.19) (14.90) (14.89) 
BTM –0.3643*** –0.3664*** –0.3366*** –0.3285*** 
 (–8.89) (–8.95) (–8.19) (–8.07) 
STDRES 17.2083*** 16.9608*** 14.9259*** 14.5556*** 
 (16.36) (16.16) (14.33) (13.91) 
Momentum –0.0986*** –0.0978*** –0.0852*** –0.0861*** 
 (–3.75) (–3.72) (–3.22) (–3.25) 
NYSE –0.3145*** –0.3051*** –0.3144*** –0.3166*** 
 (–4.63) (–4.51) (–4.58) (–4.60) 
Constant –2.0869*** –1.9744*** –1.3880*** –1.4582*** 
 (–16.99) (–16.20) (–10.24) (–11.04) 
N 52,580 52,580 52,580 52,580 
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.105 0.098 0.097 
p-value of F-test: HighAccrual 
 + HighAccrual*LowIO = 0 0.389 0.427 
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Notes:   
 
The dependent variable is short interest level (SI). Sample observations are ranked annually by calendar year and 
sorted into Accrual deciles. HighAccrual is a dummy variable takes value 1 if the firm-year ranks among the highest 
Accruals decile, 0 otherwise. lnIO is the log transformation of Institutional ownership (IO). In Model 3, LowIO is 
defined as a dummy variable taking value 1 if IO < 5%, 0 otherwise. In Model 4, LowIO is defined as a dummy 
variable taking value 1 if the 2-firm portfolio ranks among the lowest IO decile for the month, 0 otherwise. In Model 
5, LowIO is defined as a dummy variable taking value 1 if the 2-firm portfolio ranks among the lowest IO  
quintile for the month, 0 otherwise. NYSE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed on NYSE, 0 if listed 
on NASDAQ. Table 1 notes define all other variables. All independent variables are winsorized at top and bottom 
1%. The results remain qualitatively the same without winsorization. The t-statistics reported in the parentheses are 
computed based on clustered standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-cluster residual autocorrelations 
(cluster by firm). Year fixed effects are controlled in all regressions.  
 
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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Table 8 
Multivariate Analysis of Short Interest Changes 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual change in short interest level (∆SI). ∆HighAccrual is the annual change 
in the HighAccrual dummy variable. For example, if the firm ranks among the highest accrual decile at yeart − 1, but 
is no longer so at yeart, then ∆HighAccrual takes value –1 for yeart; if the firm does not rank among the highest 
accrual decile at yeart − 1, but becomes so at yeart, then ∆HighAccrual takes value +1 for yeart; otherwise, 
∆HighAccrual takes value 0. ∆lnSize, ∆Turnover, ∆BTM, ∆STDRES, ∆lnIO and ∆Momentum are annual changes 
in lnSize, Turnover, BTM, STDRES, lnIO and Momentum, respectively. 
 
The t-statistics reported in the parentheses are computed based on clustered standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within-cluster residual autocorrelations (cluster by fiscal year). The results are qualitatively 
the same if clustering by firm and controlling for fiscal year fixed effects.  
 
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
∆HighAccrual 0.1222*** 
 (2.97) 
∆lnSize 0.5006*** 
 (13.16) 
∆Turnover –0.1730 
 (–0.84) 
∆BTM 0.0185 
 (1.48) 
∆STDRES 6.5813*** 
 (5.79) 
∆lnIO 0.1243*** 
 (3.13) 
∆Momentum –0.0867*** 
 (–2.95) 
Constant 0.1140* 
 (1.95) 
N 41,350 
Adjusted R2 0.012 
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Figure 1 
 
Changes in Short Interest 
around the Time of a Move into the Highest Accruals Decile 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The Y-axis denotes the mean change in short interest. Year 0 is the event time where the firm moves into the 
highest Accruals decile. The pooled sample does not require non-missing data on institutional ownership (see Table 
1 for the definitions of IO, Accruals, and short interest).  
 
 
 
 
 
